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Delivering high reliability in maternity care: in situ 
simulation as a source of organisational resilience 
The fields of resilience engineering and high reliability organising both seek to 
explain the key sources and characteristics of safety in organisations that operate 
under conditions of considerable complexity, variability and surprise. A key focus 
in both of these fields is explaining how organisations can use adaptive and 
flexible work processes to deliver safe and reliable services, and how organisations 
can draw on past events and new experiences to increase their capacity to handle 
disruptive and unexpected events. To explore these issue, this paper develops an 
analysis of the routine use of on-site or ‘in situ’ simulation of emergency events as 
part of a systematic approach to safety management in the healthcare setting of 
maternity care. This analysis identifies three core organising processes through 
which in situ simulation can act as a source of organisational safety: relational 
rehearsal, system structuring and practice elaboration. We use this analysis to 
examine the opportunities that exist to develop more integrated explanatory 
accounts of high reliability organizing and resilience engineering. 
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Highlights 
  
 Routine use of on-site or ‘in situ’ simulation is a driver systemic safety 
 In situ simulation supports both adaptive change and stabilizing 
routinisation 
 In situ simulation creates symbolic disruptions that lead to material 
adaptation 
 In situ simulation allows work-as-imagined to be tested against work-as-
done 
 In situ simulation both enhances positive practices and addresses 
weaknesses 
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1. Introduction 
One of the most pressing challenges facing modern organisations is the need to 
deliver safe and reliable services under conditions of considerable complexity, 
change and surprise. Understanding the key sources and characteristics of safety 
in complex organisational settings is therefore a significant priority in both 
research and practice, and has become the focus of two broad fields of research. 
The field of high reliability organising is largely focused on the role of cognitive 
and organisational processes that allow unexpected and out-of-ordinary events to 
be reliably detected and flexibly responded to before they escalate out of control 
(e.g. Roberts, 1990; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999). The emerging field of 
resilience engineering (e.g. Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006; Hollnagel, 
Paries, Woods and Wreathall, 2013) encompasses a broad set of ideas, but is 
primarily focused on understanding how ongoing adaptations, adjustments and 
variations in organisational practice can underpin organisational safety. These 
two fields of inquiry remain largely disconnected despite their apparently shared 
aim of explaining how organisations can deliver safe and dependable services 
through adaptive and flexible work processes.  
This disconnect points to important fundamental questions that remain in our 
understanding of organisational safety. These questions largely concern the 
tensions between organisational stability and change (Wears, 2015; Weick, 
Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999; Macrae, 2010; 2013). How can organisations deliver 
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services that are standardised, replicable and predictable—while embracing the 
variations, disruptions and unexpected events that are inherent to organisational 
life? And how can organisations sustain stable activities and reliable routines—
while continually adapting and improving their activities in light of past 
experience, current knowledge and new evidence? To address these questions, in 
this paper we analyse the routine use of on-site or ‘in situ’ simulation of 
emergency events as part of a systematic approach to managing and improving 
safety in maternity care. We examine how the regular in situ simulation of 
unpredictable emergency events can simultaneously act as a source of 
organisational stability and organisational adaptation. We use this analysis to 
explore the nature of organisational safety, and examine the opportunities that 
exist to develop more integrated explanatory accounts of organisational high 
reliability and resilience. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce simulation as a safety 
improvement strategy and explain why healthcare in general, and maternity care 
in particular, offer an especially productive arena in which to explore the 
interconnections between organisational resilience and high reliability. Next, we 
describe the particular challenges of maternity safety, along with a well 
established maternity safety improvement programme that has in situ simulation 
as its core. Then, an analytical account is developed that aims to characterise how 
the routine use of in situ simulation can act as a systemic source of safety, through 
three organisational processes: relational rehearsal, system structuring and 
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practice elaboration. After that, we explore the implications for theories of high 
reliability organising and resilience engineering, and propose two underpinning 
organisational mechanisms that point to how we might better understand the 
nature of organisational safety and connect these fields.  
 
2. Emergencies, simulation and system safety 
Handling unexpected and unpredictable emergency situations is a challenge faced 
in many safety-critical organisations and is a key concern that connects the fields 
of high reliability organising and resilience engineering. Emergency situations 
are—by their nature—surprising, unusual and rare events in which people must 
manage demanding, time-pressured, volatile and highly hazardous situations that 
pose considerable threats to safety. Due to the high stakes involved and the 
infrequency of occurrence, many safety-critical settings practice and prepare for 
emergencies through the use of simulated emergency scenarios (Weick, 1987; 
LaPorte, 1994; Dekker et al, 2008). Simulation provides a way of recreating 
different elements of emergency situations so as to represent or amplify ‘real-
world’ experiences (Gaba, 2004). The impact of simulation varies, and can be 
influenced by a range of factors including how well simulations correspond to 
actual events encountered in daily practice, the authenticity of simulated scenarios 
and settings, and how fully participants engage in simulated exercises (eg Haji et 
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al, 2016; Crofts et al, 2006; Dutta et al, 2006). At core, simulation as a safety 
strategy embodies many of the key commitments of high reliability organising and 
resilience engineering: it is deeply concerned with the particulars of practical 
work, it is focused on developing the positive attributes and active capacities that 
underpin safe performance, and it is oriented to improving safety through 
recognising and responding to disruptions.  
Healthcare has a long tradition of using formalised simulation training to 
improve patient safety that stretches back several decades (Rosen, 2014; Schmidt 
et al, 2013), including simulating surgical complications (Arora et al 2015; Gaba et 
al 2001), anaesthesia crises (Gaba et al, 2014; Goldhaber and Howard, 2013), 
emergency medicine (Wisborg et al, 2006) and obstetric emergencies (Ayres-de-
Campos et al, 2011). Healthcare simulation has primarily focused on developing 
the skills and knowledge of individuals and the capacities of teams to 
communicate and work together effectively (Tan and Sarker, 2011; Gaba, 2010), 
and simulations are often conducted in specially designed standalone simulation 
centres. More recently, the benefits of using on-site or in situ simulation to test 
and probe real-world organisational systems have begun to be more widely 
recognised (Fent et al, 2015; Auerbach et al, 2015; Walker et al, 2013).  
In situ simulations are conducted in the actual settings in which people 
routinely work, and typically bring together the wide variety of professionals 
involved in managing particular types of healthcare emergency. This allows the 
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skills of individuals and multidisciplinary teams to be developed and optimised. It 
also allows for broader, more systemic activities of safety improvement to be 
undertaken. In particular, in situ simulation allows deficiencies in processes, 
equipment and organisational systems to be identified and improved proactively, 
before an actual emergency situation or adverse event involving a real patient 
occurs (Patterson et al, 2013; Hammam et al, 2009; Ventre et al, 2014; Riley et al, 
2010). However, despite the increasingly widespread use of in situ simulation in 
different settings, our understanding of the mechanisms through which in situ 
simulation can increase the reliability and resilience of organisational activities 
remains under-developed (Driver et al, 2011).  
 
3. Obstetric emergencies and in situ simulation 
One of the most successful long-term applications of in situ simulation as part 
of a systemic patient safety improvement programme has been developed in the 
healthcare setting of maternity care. Maternity care offers an exemplary setting to 
examine how services can be delivered reliably and safely in the face of 
complexity, variation and surprise. Maternity care—like much of healthcare—
involves the coordination of a diverse range of professionals who must routinely 
work together to manage a wide variety of patients, conditions and interventions. 
Scientific evidence, medical technology and clinical practice evolve rapidly. And in 
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maternity care in particular, an extremely wide spectrum of care is delivered. 
Childbirth is a natural process but it brings with it a range of risks, and the 
transition from a normal, routine delivery with little or no intervention to an 
urgent and life-threatening obstetric emergency can happen rapidly and with little 
warning. Around one in twelve deliveries are associated with some form of 
adverse event (Nielson et al, 2007). Preventable harm can be catastrophic to the 
women, children and families involved (Kirkup, 2015). In addition to these deeply 
personal tragedies, preventable harm related to childbirth is also extraordinarily 
expensive: substandard maternity care and its consequences cost the National 
Health Service in England £3.1 billion between 2000-2010 (NHSLA, 2013). 
Obstetric emergencies take a variety of forms and are rare events but demand 
rapid, reliable and complex management. For example, each year a typical 
maternity unit in the UK will be required to manage only two cases of eclampsia: a 
serious and life threatening condition related to high blood pressure in the mother 
that involves convulsions and can lead to coma (Thompson, Neal and Clark, 
2004). Like all obstetric emergencies, eclampsia requires immediate and complex 
emergency management involving a range of clinical interventions delivered by a 
variety of professionals. Managing eclampsia requires control of the mother’s 
airway, delivery of oxygen, administration of magnesium therapy to stop seizures, 
control of hypertension, electronic monitoring of the baby, testing of the mother’s 
blood and other physiological signs, as well as delivery of the baby (Thompson, 
Neal and Clark, 2004). This emergency response requires the effective and rapid 
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coordination of midwives, obstetricians, anaesthetists, healthcare support 
workers, laboratory staff, porters, switchboard operators and also operating 
theatre staff if a caesarian section is required—along with all of the associated 
equipment, materials and supplies.  
Other rare but serious obstetric emergencies include, for example: cord 
prolapse, where the umbilical cord is delivered before the baby, necessitating 
emergency intervention and urgent caesarian section; post partum haemorrhage, 
where serious bleeding occurs soon after birth requiring rapid diagnosis and 
treatment; shoulder dystocia, where the baby’s shoulder gets stuck during 
delivery, requiring careful intervention to prevent serious damage to the baby’s 
tissues and nerves which can lead to permanent injury and paralysis; and 
maternal collapse, where the mother’s health rapidly and severely deteriorates, 
and may include heart attack and loss of consciousness.  
 
3.1. Practical Obstetric Multi-Professional Training 
An increasingly widespread approach to improving safety in maternity care is 
the use of various methods of emergency simulations and ‘drills’ targeted at 
improving the handling of obstetric emergencies. (RCM, 2002; RCOG, 1999; TJC, 
2004, NHSLA, 2000; MCHRC, 2000). One of the most established and successful 
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applications of in situ simulation in maternity care is the Practical Obstetric 
Multi-Professional Training (PROMPT) programme. PROMPT is an integrated 
and systematic approach to safety improvement in maternity care that 
encompasses different forms of skills training, emergency simulation and systems 
improvement (Winter et al, 2012a). The PROMPT programme has been developed 
over fifteen years at Southmead hospital in the South West of the United 
Kingdom. PROMPT has subsequently been adopted by around 85% of UK units 
and is increasingly being used internationally, including in the US, Australia, Asia 
and Africa (Draycott, 2013). At its core, PROMPT represents an integrated 
approach to safety improvement that is supported by a set of practical manuals, 
simple tools and systems design processes, all of which are put into practice and 
regularly tested and improved through the routine use of in situ simulations of 
obstetric emergencies. These simulations bring together multi-professional 
clinical teams in their normal working environment to rehearse, reflect and 
improve on their collective practice and the systems, processes and tools that 
support this practice. The focus is therefore both on simulating and improving 
skills, and simulating and improving systems (Box 1).  
Since the development and introduction of PROMPT in 2002, the maternity 
unit at Southmead has demonstrated significantly improved safety outcomes, 
including a 70% reduction in neonatal injuries related to situations in which the 
baby's shoulder becomes obstructed during labour (brachial plexus injuries 
related to shoulder dystocia); a 50% reduction in infants born with low measures 
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of physical condition (five minute Apgar scores of less than seven); and significant 
reductions in the time between the diagnosis and delivery of babies in emergency 
situations where the umbilical cord is delivered before the baby (cord prolapse), 
improving outcomes for babies (Draycott et al, 2006; Draycott et al, 2008; 
Siassakos et al, 2009; Siassakos et al, 2011). Over this same period, maternity 
related litigation claims at the hospital have fallen from £25m to £3m (Draycott et 
al, 2015). The implementation of PROMPT has also been associated with positive 
outcomes for staff, with staff attitude surveys indicating a positive safety 
culture, excellent teamwork climate and high job satisfaction (Siassakos, 2011). 
Achieving such tangible improvements in safety outcomes is unusual in 
healthcare, and places Southmead as one of the safest maternity units in the world 
in terms of birth complications (Draycott, 2013). This success is particularly 
striking given that other programmes that have aimed to improve skills and 
knowledge in relation to obstetric emergencies have, in some cases, ended up 
increasing the rate of injuries and adverse outcomes (MacKenzie et al, 2007; 
Draycott et al, 2015).  
The PROMPT programme therefore offers a particularly valuable opportunity 
to explore and characterise the use of what might be termed systemic in situ 
simulation: where the simulation of emergency events and crises is used to 
routinely probe, test and improve organisational systems and situated practices as 
part of a long-term, systematic and structured approach to safety improvement. In 
this sense, rather like the foundational studies of high reliability organising, 
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PROMPT is an exemplary case of how in situ simulation is currently “working in 
practice but not in theory” (La Porte, 1991). PROMPT represents a demonstrably 
successful suite of safety improvement activities that have been developed over 
many years, drawing on deep practical and contextual knowledge (e.g. Siassakos 
et al, 2013; Siassakos et al, 2009; Draycott et al, 2015). Accordingly, the purpose 
of this paper is to reflect on PROMPT as an exemplary case, using it to 
characterise the key organising processes through which in situ simulation can 
underpin organisational resilience and high reliability—and to then use that 
analysis to explore connections between these two fields. The characterisation 
developed here thus represents a moment in an ongoing theorising process 
(Weick, 1995), and offers an emerging account of some of the key reliability-
seeking and resilience-enhancing characteristics of systemic in situ simulation.  
Box 1. In situ simulation in PROMPT 
 
 
Core features of the Practical Obstetric Multi-Professional Training programme 
at Southmead Hospital include: 
 
 Training and simulation day held once every 8 weeks including a range of 
emergency drills that simulate different obstetric emergency scenarios.  
 Simulations typically run in situ and involve the full multi-professional 
team, in the labour ward or typical place of occurrence for the simulated 
emergency. 
 All staff must attend at least once a year, including midwives, 
obstetricians, anaesthetists and midwife care assistants. Annual 
attendance closely approximates 100% (Siassokos 2009).  
 Patient actors play the role of the mother, along with high-fidelity 
simulation equipment that mimics birthing scenarios and signs and 
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symptoms, from high-technology birth mannequin to low-technology 
props including trousers with sheets of red silk to simulate blood loss.  
 Heavy focus on the technical and non-technical skills required to 
effectively manage different types of obstetric emergency, with an 
emphasis on effective communication, team work and cross-disciplinary 
working in practice.  
 Reflective feedback is built in: one team participates in simulation, 
another observes and takes structured notes on both clinical and team 
working issues. Debriefing sessions explore what went well and why, and 
what could be improved and how.  
 Running emergency simulations in the actual work setting allows staff to 
ensure they can locate and use essential emergency equipment and test 
real-time requests for supplies such as blood products and 
pharmaceuticals.  
 Comprehensive manuals specify the range of emergencies that may be 
encountered and condense evidence-based guidelines and standards into 
the key practical responses and steps required (Winter et al, 2012a; 
2012b).  
 Algorithms, checklists and protocols have been developed to support 
cognition and decision making in relation to specific emergencies, and in 
situ simulation allows these use of these to be trained and tested in 
practice. 
 A set of material tools and standardised organisational processes have 
been designed to standardize and structure action in emergencies, such 
as emergency boxes containing the essential materials for managing a 
particular emergency.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. The simulated sources of organisational safety  
Achieving high levels of safety in maternity care represents a considerable 
organisational accomplishment. It depends on maintaining an ongoing capacity to 
identify and manage rare obstetric emergencies while performing the normal, 
routine work of maternity care. Obstetric emergencies can develop rapidly and the 
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outcome for both mother and baby depends on efficiently organising a complex 
set of activities. Maternity staff must be able to recognise and respond to obstetric 
emergencies swiftly, reliably coordinating complex emergency interventions by a 
diverse team of specialists. These emergency actions must be attuned to the 
specific situation at hand, responding to the unique signs, condition and history of 
the mother and baby, while ensuring that appropriate evidence based standards of 
care are delivered efficiently and compassionately. To support this, the material 
resources, clinical knowledge, practical skills and work environment must all be 
maintained and ready to support action at a moment’s notice.  
Our analysis here centres on identifying the organising processes and social 
factors through which in situ simulation acts as a source of organizational safety 
in maternity care. We identify three core processes that are supported by in situ 
simulation and that underpin high reliability: relational rehearsal, systems 
structuring and practice elaboration (Table 1). Relational rehearsal represents the 
social processes that are involved in building shared expectations, establishing 
patterns of collective working and maintaining trust amongst the many diverse 
professionals who must rapidly come together to respond to an obstetric 
emergency. System structuring concerns the processes that are involved in 
designing, testing and improving the organisational systems and infrastructures 
that support rapid and adaptive responses to emergency situations. Practice 
elaboration concerns the processes involved in examining, refining, improving 
and embedding clinical practices that allow timely and effective responses to a 
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wide variety of problematic situations. In the sections that follow, each of these is 
examined in turn.  
 
Table 1. The organizational mechanisms supported by systemic in situ 
simulation that contribute to organizational safety.  
Relational rehearsal System structuring Practice elaboration 
Shared expectations Organisational improvement Embodied wisdom 
Collective trust Cognitive infrastructure Reflective inquiry 
 
 
4.1. Relational rehearsal 
Social relations are the basis of resilience and high reliability (Weick and Roberts 
1993). In situ simulation, as employed within the PROMPT system, provides a 
space and a set of activities that aim to establish social roles and relations that 
enable the rapid detection, communication and management of emerging 
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problems and emergency events. These processes of relational rehearsal involve at 
least two core and interdependent elements: shared expectations and collective 
trust.  
 
4.1.1. Shared expectations 
In situ simulation allows the development of shared expectations regarding 
individual roles and responsibilities, the patterns of communication, and the flow 
of coordinated activity required to manage emergencies. Maintaining clear role 
structures in high performing teams is essential to support ongoing understanding 
and coordination (Weick, 1993). The safe management of obstetric emergencies 
requires rapid and coordinated action from a range of different professionals. This 
emergency work is critically important but relatively unusual. That is, the work 
that is most consequential to safe outcomes is also the most complex and the least 
routinely experienced, and is performed by teams who may not have worked 
together in similar circumstances. Engaging in simulated emergencies allows 
individuals to understand the nature of their role in relation to the work of others 
during emergency situations, creating shared expectations regarding the scope 
and remit of each role within a rapidly formed team. A central feature of high 
reliability organising is the appreciation that each individual has of their place in a 
broader system of activity, and a shared understanding and heedfulness towards 
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the actions of others (Weick and Roberts, 1993). In situ simulation also allows 
these shared expectations to be formed across broad systems of activity, including 
team members who may be present at the bedside but also others elsewhere in the 
organization, such as blood bank staff or paramedics. In situ simulation builds 
these practical expectations of how specific roles interface with the tasks of others. 
These shared expectations can then provide a normative benchmark against which 
deviations can be detected (Rochlin, 1989; Weick and Roberts, 1993; Resar, 
2006). 
 
4.1.2. Collective trust 
Working together in simulated emergencies allows individuals to build confidence 
in their own abilities and trust in the ability of colleagues to act effectively. 
Communication barriers and professional silos can be a considerable challenge in 
safety-critical settings, and inter-professional barriers have contributed to serious 
safety issues in healthcare —and maternity disasters in particular (Kirkup, 2015). 
In situ simulation helps to establish an open and safe space where professionals 
from different backgrounds can work on developing their strengths, acknowledge 
and address their weaknesses and build confidence in their collective capabilities. 
Building trust is aided by the design of the simulation events: PROMPT is not a 
test of individual performance (Weinger et al, 2014; Winter et al, 2012b) but 
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provides a space to reflect on and improve practices, to share knowledge and 
practical experience, and to strengthen social and professional bonds. Fun is an 
important feature: simulations should be challenging and taken seriously, but also 
enjoyable (e.g. Gallagher and Corrado, 2014) and lighter hearted moments are 
incorporate into PROMPT events to increase open interactions. More subtly, 
PROMPT’s in situ simulations emphasise the role of the systems in which people 
work—and how the actions of individuals helps create and constitute the system 
within which everyone works. Building a shared understanding of the role of local 
context and wider systems in individual and team performance reduces 
tendencies to blame individuals (Sutcliffe and Weick, 2003), and helps to build 
collective trust. In combination, all of this can reduce fear: fear of speaking up, 
fear that others will not perform as needed, and fear that you yourself do not know 
how to respond when the worst happens.  
 
  
4.2. System structuring  
Some of the most fundamental functions of in situ simulation, as employed within 
the PROMPT system, are the design and improvement of the organizational 
systems that support the management of obstetric emergencies. System 
structuring consists of activities that are targeted at designing the sociotechnical 
processes of maternity care, and testing and refining those designs in the practical 
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settings in which they are enacted. These activities can be characterised as 
primarily focusing on two key elements: organisational improvement and 
cognitive infrastructure.  
 
4.2.1. Organisational improvement 
In situ simulation provides a space in which idealised models of organisational 
activity can be tested, adapted and implemented in practice. And it also provides a 
space in which deficiencies in current work systems and organisational 
arrangements can be identified and addressed. This allows ‘systems probing’ 
(Driver et al, 2011) for organizational improvement: testing and adapting the local 
contexts, materials, resources and organisational processes that support practical 
work—essential but mundane practicalities such as ensuring that equipment is 
accessible and functional, and that people know how to use it. One particularly 
striking example of organisational improvement in the PROMPT programme is 
the development and use of ‘emergency boxes’. Emergency boxes—such as the 
‘Post Partum Haemorrhage (PPH) box’ or the ‘Eclampsia box’ (Draycott, Broad 
and Chidley, 2000)—contain the common materials and tools that are required to 
handle a specific emergency situation. Emergency boxes represent a simple 
organisational design for reliably providing the right equipment at the right time—
but the box, on its own, achieves little. In situ simulation allows the practical use 
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of emergency boxes to be tested, routinized and improved, and in so doing, allows 
reliable social and organizational processes to be developed around the 
implementation and use of standardised tools and protocols.  
In situ simulation also allows the broader organisational systems that surround 
emergency response to be routinely tested and improved. In the case of a post 
partum haemorrhage, these include the emergency call system to summon 
assistance, and the need for rapid delivery of specific blood products. Each of 
these in itself represents a complex sociotechnical process. For example, an 
emergency buzzer system consists of the technical alarm that must be maintained, 
serviceable, accessible and audible, a ‘code red’ protocol and pre-determined list 
of who to contact and who should attend for different scenarios and situations, 
along with all the social arrangements and expectations required to support this. 
Regularly testing these systems allows for deficiencies to be identified and 
practical improvements to be made. More fundamentally, for staff, the experience 
of regularly testing and improving systems can foster a more generalised 
intolerance of glitches in systems and mis-specified processes and can help build a 
social license for adapting work systems. For example, instituting the routine of 
hanging a sign on the door during team debriefings that indicates who on the 
ward has the keys to the drug cabinet, to avoid unnecessary and repeated 
interruptions. These are all key drivers of high reliability organising (Schulman, 
2004; Roberts and Creed, 1993).  
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4.2.2. Cognitive infrastructure  
Safe systems of collaborative work depend on maintaining situational awareness, 
shared understanding and heedful interaction in relation to risk (Weick and 
Roberts, 1993). This cognitive infrastructure of high reliability (Weick, Sutcliffe 
and Obstfeld, 1999) can in part be supported by standardized cognitive aids such 
as checklists, protocols, decision algorithms and emergency manuals that facilitate 
coordinated thinking and acting (Marshall, 2013). PROMPT is based on a variety 
of cognitive aids that condense a huge amount of established knowledge, and 
hundreds of pages of clinical evidence and guidelines, into easily accessed tools 
that orient attention and structure action (Draycott, 2006). Like many cognitive 
aids, these tools capture essential—and often easily overlooked—practical actions, 
such as checking that the date and time on cardiotocography (CTG) machines are 
always set and checked (Winter et al, 2012a). These tools, in the form of decision 
algorithms and itemized checklists, provide anchors around which coordinated 
activity can unfold. They constitute representational media that can share the 
cognitive load in pressured situations, create shared mental models of normative 
and actual activities, support distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1996) and help to 
build operational representations (Bigley and Roberts, 2001) that capture current 
operational status and structure key decision points. To do this effectively, 
cognitive aids must be available, meaningful and actively integrated into ongoing 
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activities (Goldhaber-Fiebert et al, 2016; Goldhaber-Fiebert and Howard, 2013, 
Marshall, 2013). In situ simulation provides a regular and protected space in 
which staff can familiarise themselves with the use of different cognitive aids in 
practice, and integrate these into their collective patterns of work. This also allows 
cognitive aids to be tested and improved through iterative practical feedback, 
along with other organizational processes.  
 
4.3. Practice elaboration 
A key function of in situ simulation is the elaboration, refinement and 
improvement of professional practice. Practice elaboration represents a set of 
processes that support the rehearsal and refinement of work practices and the 
purposeful testing of new or unusual practices. When conducted in the local 
contexts and settings in which people normally work, in situ simulation allows the 
interaction between practices, contexts and organisational systems to be reflected 
on and refined. Practice elaboration can be characterised as focusing on two key 
elements: embodied wisdom and reflective inquiry.  
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4.3.1. Embodied wisdom 
In situ simulation allows abstract knowledge to be connected with practical, 
embodied work in the settings in which that work is actually done. In maternity 
care, many of the key responses required in different types of emergency will be 
understood by healthcare professional in the abstract, through professional 
education and established guidelines (e.g. RCOG, 2011). However, this knowledge 
may be rarely drawn on in day-to-day work. In situ simulation allows that formal 
knowledge to be put into practice in the natural settings in which people work, 
developing understanding not only of what to do, but how to do it. Tacit and 
embodied knowledge of how to perform skilled clinical tasks is central to safe 
healthcare, but tacit knowledge can’t be transferred or taught directly; it has to be 
developed by doing (Cook and Brown, 1999). PROMPT simulation sessions are 
particularly concerned with developing the particular technical skills required to 
manage obstetric emergencies. Importantly, this provides a space in which 
practical tips, recipes and heuristics can be shared and circulated amongst staff—
such as the ‘Pringle tube’ technique for positioning one’s hand while safely 
manipulating a shoulder dystocia emergency (touch all fingertips and thumbtip 
together as if reaching into a Pringle tube) (Cornthwaite et al 2015), or the 
perceptual rules of thumb for estimating blood loss (a bed pan is around half a 
litre; blood spilling from the bed onto the floor is around 2 litres) (Winter et al, 
2012a). Circulating and rehearsing this embodied knowledge is an important 
process of stabilizing and improving the practical work of clinical care. Equally, 
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for each of the main types of obstetric emergency, the PROMPT sessions and 
associated manuals highlight the most common practical problems and difficulties 
that staff might encounter in real-world settings. Many of these challenges have 
been discovered through prior drills and simulations, and have themselves been 
woven back into the manuals and scenario plans (Winter et al, 2012a).  
 
4.3.2. Reflective inquiry  
Regular in situ simulation creates a space for routine reflection on, and 
observation of, practical work in the settings it is actually conducted in. Reflective 
inquiry involves turning work itself into an object of inquiry, allowing practices 
and the systems that surround them to be examined, reflected on, reorganised and 
improved (Miettinen and Virkkunen, 2005). Reflecting on the work, and on the 
way things actually get done, is an essential skill that can sometimes be regarded 
as beneath highly trained professionals in healthcare (Batalden, 2010). By turning 
this into a normalised and regularised way of working, regular in situ simulation 
allows the practices of reflective inquiry and adaptive change to be built into a 
broader system of safety improvement. PROMPT intentionally does not use in situ 
simulation as a test of individual knowledge and skills, but instead aims to create 
an environment in which professionals get used to observing, being observed and 
reflecting on their own work practices. Facilitated debriefs at the end of each 
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simulated scenario provides an opportunity to reflect on performance in a 
collegiate environment, and to give and receive productive, constructive and 
improvement-focused feedback. This embeds reflective inquiry into the normal 
work environment, contributing to a culture in which noticing, speaking up and 
inquiring into practical problems is routine. More broadly, this helps to 
operationalise the principle that noticing is enhanced by acting: being empowered 
to inquire into and act on problems expands the range of problems that are 
noticed in the first place (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999). This can contribute 
to a culture in which people notice and act more—both in relation to positive 
features of practice to elaborate, and discrepancies in systems to address. 
 
5. Discussion: Rehearsing resilience and 
reorganising high reliability 
Analysing the routine use of in situ simulation in a maternity care setting offers a 
range of key insights regarding the organisational sources of safety, as well as the 
interconnections between theories of resilience engineering and high reliability 
organising. These insights focus on the nature of organisational stability and 
change, the relationship between proactive and reactive forms of safety 
management, and the interconnections between efforts to amplify and spread 
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improvements and efforts to identify and address organisational weaknesses. One 
of the key areas of intersection revealed by our analysis of in situ simulation 
concerns the tension between stability and change as sources of organisational 
safety. Systemic in situ simulation can simultaneously act as both a source of 
standardisation and as a source of adaptation in organisational practices. In the 
short term, the rehearsal of emergency events allows the development of stable 
patterns of social interaction and allows essential elements of emergency response 
to be routinised. These routines and shared expectations can provide the 
foundation for more flexible and adaptive responses in moments of crises. Over 
the longer term, in situ simulation allows continual examination and adaptation of 
organisational activities. It provides mechanisms through which practical work 
and organisational systems can be reorganised and improved in light of past 
experience and new evidence. Systemic in situ simulation therefore sits at the 
intersection between stability and change, flexibility and standardisation, and 
routinisation and adaptation.  
Another area of intersection is that in situ simulation provides a set of 
activities that simultaneously seek to amplify and develop the positive 
characteristics of systems and practices, while at the same time identifying and 
addressing weaknesses in those same systems and practices. In theory these 
processes are often distinguished as different modes of safety management, with 
the focus on one or the other: either amplifying ‘good’ practices, or addressing and 
mitigating ‘bad’ events. However, in practice it can be hard—if not impossible—to 
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disentangle these two sources of organisational safety. The ways these processes 
intersect point to opportunities to refine our theories of safety, improvement and 
risk.  
Finally, examining the systematic use of in situ simulation offers an exemplary 
case to explore how proactive and reactive activities of safety management are 
inextricably entwined. The timing of safety—when it occurs in relation to a 
disruptive event—has been a central concern in the fields of resilience engineering 
and high reliability organising. However, our analysis suggests that this tension 
can be resolved by shifting attention to the nature of the processes through which 
disruptive events can enact safety, rather than argue over their timing.  
We discuss these interconnections between current thinking on resilience and 
high reliability by first analysing the complicated relationship between 
organisational strengths and organisational weaknesses in safety management. 
Then we explore the nature of proactive and reactive modes of safety. Finally we 
examine the deep and underlying tension between stability and change in 
organisational theories of safety. We use this analysis to point to new ways of 
connecting the fields of resilience engineering and high reliability organising.  
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5.1. Connecting strength and weakness 
A persistent debate in the theory and practice of organisational resilience and 
reliability is the appropriate balance between developing positive attributes of 
safety or addressing weaknesses—between the light and dark side of 
organisational safety. Historically, much of our knowledge of safety has been 
derived from moments of its absence: the analysis of accidents, incidents and 
failures (Reason, 2000; Macrae, 2014). Equally, many of the traditional strategies 
of safety and risk management have been oriented to episodes of weakness and 
failure. The definition of safety itself has often rested on a double negative: the 
avoidance of harm (Rochlin, 1999; Hollnagel, Wears and Braithwaite, 2015). This 
focus on the negative face of safety—on failure, weakness and harm—is partly due 
to a deep asymmetry of meaning: the occurrence of harmful outcomes clearly 
indicates the absence of safety, but the avoidance of harm does not necessarily 
indicate a state of safety (Reason, 2000). The fields of high reliability and 
resilience engineering emerged in large part to address this asymmetry by 
attempting to characterise and explain the positive characteristics of 
organisational activity that underpin safe, reliable and resilient performance.  
Work in the field of resilience engineering heavily emphasises the need to 
understand and characterise the positive features of organisational safety—both in 
theory and in practice. A key tenet is the importance of examining why actions 
achieve their intended purposes and ‘go right’, rather than only paying attention 
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to when things ‘go wrong’ (Hollnagel, 2013). The focus of resilience engineers is 
on the everyday performances that underpin success and safe outcomes, despite 
the complications, interruptions and uncertainties inherent to organisational life. 
Methodologically, there is an emphasis on focusing on organisational strengths 
and assets, and engaging in appreciative enquiry to understand what works well 
(Hollnagel, Braithwaite and Wears, 2013; Bushe, 2011). This focus on the positive 
features of organisational safety shares much with recent interest in ‘positive 
deviance’ that aims to identify unusual or exceptional success in order to 
understand and spread what works (Lawton et al, 2014; Bradley et al, 2009). The 
practical goal is to create situations in which ‘as many things as possible go right’ 
(Hollnagel, Wears and Braithwaite, 2015).  
This emphasis on ‘what works’ in practice, and on positive features of 
organisational strength in the face of disruption and uncertainty, has equally 
defined much of the research that theorises processes of high reliability organising 
(Roberts, 1990; V0gus, 2011). The field of high reliability represents a decades-
long commitment to explaining the positive organisational and practical 
characteristics of safety—although in theories of high reliability, these are always 
examined in relation to how organisations handle and address disruptions, 
anomalies and unexpected events. That is, explanations of high reliability 
organising typically focus on how practical strengths become organised around 
operational weaknesses.  
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Our analysis of the key organising processes that underpin the systemic use of 
in situ simulation points to a much deeper and complex set of interconnections 
between the light and dark sides of organisational safety. Systemic in situ 
simulation represents a strategy of safety improvement that simultaneously seeks 
to enhance positive organisational characteristics whilst also addressing 
organisational weaknesses and deficiencies. This analysis indicates that these two 
processes may be much closer in form and function than previously considered, 
and may be inseparable in practice. Systemic in situ simulation provides a space 
that is directly targeted at understanding, rehearsing and amplifying the practical 
patterns of activity that allow normal work to produce successful outcomes: 
developing the skills, knowledge and resources to prepare for and work around 
the challenges inherent to organisational life. The process of simulating, 
debriefing and reflecting on practice creates a safe space to identify and 
strengthen the activities that produces success. Equally, systemic in situ 
simulation is also directly targeted at identifying and addressing weaknesses in 
systems and practices. Simulating events in actual organisational settings allows 
organisational weaknesses and system deficiencies to be surfaced and addressed.  
The systemic use of in situ simulation might therefore be explained through 
two processes: one identifies failures and weaknesses, and allows those to be 
addressed and improved; the other identifies successes and strengths, and allows 
those to be embedded and spread. However, both of these processes involve a 
relative improvement: they involve replacing one way of organising work with a 
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better way. For example, in the maternity emergency of shoulder dystocia, the 
‘Pringle tube’ solution to hand positioning represents a model of one small 
element of practice that is superior to other approaches that are more likely to 
cause harm. Simulation is used to spread this knowledge, develop this skill and 
embed this into the practical repertoire across an entire unit. This necessarily 
involves a more appropriate and successful element of practice displacing less 
successful or weaker forms of practice. Whether this process involves spreading 
‘what works’—building on the positive—or is instead focused on identifying and 
addressing a ‘weakness’—eradicating a source of failure—is a somewhat arbitrary 
distinction.  
In practice, the process of spreading ‘good’ practice and addressing ‘bad’ 
practice can be hard to neatly separate. There is always a displacement of one set 
of practices with another. Addressing problems and weaknesses requires 
developing better, stronger practices. And identifying and spreading successful 
and effective practices requires replacing prior weaker practices. Strength and 
weakness, and success and failure, are inextricably linked: they are a duality, and 
one cannot exist without the other. Recognising this duality has implications for 
how we understand the relationship between resilience and high reliability. The 
social processes of organising around distinct and disruptive episodes of failure 
(as explained by theories of high reliability) may echo the ways that routine work 
is organised around the variations and fluctuations of normal operations (which is 
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the concern of resilience engineering). Differences between may be ones of scale 
and degree, rather than kind.  
 
5.2. Integrating proaction and reaction 
A persistent debate in organisational safety is about time: when does safety 
happen? Do the key activities that support safety occur before some sort of 
disruptive and adverse event, or do they occur after it? These issues are often 
framed in terms of reactive and proactive approaches to safety management. 
Safety strategies either focus on reactively responding to and recovering from 
events once they have occurred, or they focus on proactively preparing for and 
preventing events in the first place (Cox and Tait, 1991; Hollnagel, 2012). This 
question of timing has implicitly shaped debates about resilience, safety and risk 
since the 1980s and informs some of the most fundamental assumptions that 
underpin theories of resilience engineering and high reliability organising. In 
particular, these assumptions have focused on the temporal dimension of 
disruptions and events in the production of organisational resilience and high 
reliability: either as a trigger for recovery and adaptation, or as a target for 
prevention and reduction. Our analysis of the organising processes of in situ 
simulation points to how assumptions about the proactive and reactive modes of 
safety management might be reinterpreted, and how the fundamental role of 
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disruption in theories of resilience engineering and high reliability organising 
might be recast to bring these two fields closer together.  
The issue of timing was fundamental to early analyses of resilience as a safety 
strategy. Drawing on ecological theories and economic models, Wildavsky (1988) 
originally defined resilience as a safety strategy based on flexibility and adaptation 
in response to failures: an ongoing process of distributed and repeated trial and 
error learning. Resilience was posed as a direct response to the centralised and 
anticipatory strategy of attempting to predict, prepare and prevent future harmful 
events—activities which can lead to wasting resources preparing for events that 
never happened, or losing opportunities to develop new knowledge and insight 
through experimentation and failure (Wildavsky, 1988). The field of resilience 
engineering has radically expanded the definition of resilience and continues to 
develop and enlarge its scope. Early definitions retained the assumption that 
resilience happened in response to events, defining resilience as the degree to 
which a system can handle disruptions and variations that fall outside the existing 
operating model of a system (Woods, 2006).  
Increasingly, however, the overarching boundaries of the field of resilience 
engineering have expanded to encompass all modes of proactive and reactive 
forms of organisational safety (Westrum, 2006, p56). The working definition of 
resilience has equally expanded its temporal reach, to “the intrinsic ability of a 
system to adjust its functioning before, during, or after changes and disturbances, 
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so that it can sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected 
conditions” (Hollnagel, 2012, p. 7). This definition seeks to integrate the activities 
of proactive and reactive safety management. And, while work within the field of 
resilience engineering rarely acknowledges or draws on models of resilience 
developed outside the field (Bergstrom, van Winsen and Henriqson, 2015), this 
temporal expansion echoes moves in other work on resilience, such as in political 
science and crisis management. For example, Comfort, Boin and Demchack 
(2010, p. 9) similarly define resilience as “the capacity of a social system … to 
proactively adapt to and recover from disturbances that are perceived within the 
system to fall outside the range of normal and expected disturbances”. Resilience 
is increasingly conceptualised as a combination of both proactive and reactive 
activities of adaptation and recovery, that takes place in relation to some form of 
disruption.  
Theories of high reliability organising equally grapple with issues of timing. 
An argument often made of high reliability organisations is that they must learn 
without the use of trial and error, lest the first error be the last trial (Weick and 
Sutcliffe, 2001). Presumably, the assumption here is that these error events will be 
significant in terms of material impact, and therefore must be avoided. At the 
same time, it is commonly asserted that learning from errors and organising 
around disruptions are the defining features of HROs (Rochlin, 1989; Roberts, 
Rousseau and La Porte, 1994). The events these statements refer to are 
presumably small and contained—the mishaps, anomalies and near-misses that 
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are common in organisational life. Roe and Schulman (2016) have refined the 
relationship of high reliability to triggering events, and distinguish between 
precursor resilience and recovery resilience. Precursor resilience represents the 
preparatory work that seeks to maintain the capacity to respond to adverse events 
if need be, and recovery resilience represents the capacity to react and respond 
after the onset of a significant disturbance. This distinction echoes Boin and van 
Eeten’s (2013) conceptualisation of proactive and reactive modes of resilience.  
Our analysis of in situ simulation has deep and fundamental implications 
regarding the relationship between disruptions and organisational safety. One 
obvious observation is that rehearsing and simulating potential emergency 
scenarios is a mechanism of proactively preparing to reactively recover from 
disturbances. Simulation maintains and develops the skills needed to handle 
emergencies if and when they occur. More importantly, using in situ simulation to 
probe systems, identify weaknesses and improve processes represents a process of 
adaptation that unfolds around artificial or synthesised disruptions. The problems 
identified in simulations do not have any adverse or material disruption on 
organisational activity—but they can result in material changes to organisational 
processes. As such, in situ simulation demonstrates how adaptive organisational 
responses can be entirely uncoupled from materially disruptive events. In situ 
simulation creates a stream of symbolic or imagined disruptions that can be used 
to proactively rehearse reactive emergency responses, and that can also be used to 
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adaptively reorganise work systems and redesign organisational processes—before 
any materially adverse event occurs.  
Acknowledging this distinction between symbolically constructed disruptions 
(in simulated scenarios) and materially impactful disruptions (in actual service 
provision) shifts the reference point of safety away from materially disruptive 
events to culturally disruptive events. In doing so, it points to an important point 
of interconnection between theories of resilience engineering and high reliability 
(Macrae, 2014). Simulations are symbolic acts carried out in practice: put another 
way, simulation is a form of practical imagination. In situ simulation creates a 
symbolic arena in which to explore, uncover, adapt and improve real-world 
organisational systems and practices. Adaptations and improvements can be 
generated from events that are disruptive only in the cultural sense: they 
challenge common assumptions about how systems work, reveal collective 
blindspots in understanding and uncover gaps in shared practice (Turner, 1978).  
Understood in this way, from a resilience engineering perspective in situ 
simulation is a way of continually testing work-as-imagined by comparing it with 
work-as-done, and actively generating and inquiring into surprising gaps in work 
systems (Hollnagel and Woods, 2006)—but in an entirely safe and protected 
space, where the only impacts of failure will be symbolic. From the perspective of 
high reliability organising, in situ simulation is a process that can actively produce 
surprising events that can continually challenge expectations, triggering processes 
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of collective inquiry and adaptation (Rochlin, 1989; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
1999). In situ simulation allows organisations to explore and update the ‘non-goal’ 
that they are seeking to avoid (Roberts and Creed, 1993). How organisations 
generate, identify and respond to symbolic disruptions may therefore prove to be 
a productive area of intersection in future theories of high reliability and resilience 
engineering, and could help shift debates beyond temporal categories of proactive 
and reactive safety management.  
A related challenge fundamental to safety management is dealing with entirely 
novel or completely unexpected events—circumstances that have never been 
experienced before and are entirely outside the range of current expectations and 
predictions. By definition, these ‘fundamental surprises’ (Lanir, 1986; 
Christianson et al 2009) are unpredictable and inconceivable: they represent 
‘impossible’ events (Wagenaar and Groeneweg, 1987)—at least from the 
perspective of those involved. This is one area where simulation would appear to 
meets its limits. Events that cannot be predicted or even imagined cannot be 
simulated. However, while it is not possible to imagine and rehearse every 
possible future event, the use of in situ simulation allows organisations to develop 
and stabilize a set of cognitive, social and material resources that can be drawn on 
and recombined when confronted with fundamental surprise. To an extent, every 
obstetric emergency event is novel and new, and differs from previous experiences 
in terms of the staff involved, the history of the patient and the resources to hand. 
In situ simulation allows the development of a repertoire of skills, knowledge, 
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heuristics and recipes—while at the same time providing experience in applying 
and recombining those as needed in practice. It is still possible to proactively 
prepare for events that might only make sense in retrospect.  
 
5.3. Organising stability and change  
One of the most fundamental issues in understanding and explaining 
organisational safety is the deep tension between organisational stability and 
change: how organisations can handle variations and disruptions whilst delivering 
stable and reliable services (Wears, 2015). The fields of resilience engineering and 
high reliability organising define and address these issues in different ways. The 
key concepts and mechanisms in studies of high reliability organising seek to 
understand how experts and knowledge can be mobilised around unexpected 
events. The emphasis has been on the social and cognitive infrastructure that 
supports the ongoing monitoring and detection of deviations from normal 
operations (Weick and Roberts, 1993; Schulman, 1993), and flexible organising 
around key moments of disruption (Reason, 1997; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 
1999). In resilience engineering, fluctuation and variability are viewed as deeply 
inherent to all practical work, and organisational safety is a result of continual 
adaptations, adjustments and flexible responses to the fluctuations in 
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organisational life and the unpredictability inherent in any work setting 
(Hollnagel, 2012; Hollnagel, Braithwaite and Wears, 2013).  
Theories of resilience engineering and high reliability organising emphasise 
the importance of learning and positive change over time: making sustained 
alterations and improvements to organisational systems. However, how these 
long-term changes are initiated and unfold, and how they relate to real-time 
responses to fluctuations and disruptions, remain relatively under-explored. 
Efforts to understand these tensions between stability and change have a long 
history in organisational studies—particularly in terms of the relationship 
between, on the one hand, the habits (Simon, 1976; Vogus and Hilligoss, 2016), 
plans (Suchman, 1987) and routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982) that underpin 
persistent and largely automatic patterns of organisational activity, and on the 
other hand, adaptive and consciously directed activities of change and 
improvement (Miettenen and Virkkunen, 2005).  
Our analysis of systemic in situ simulation points to two fundamental modes 
of organising that help explain how organisational activities can simultaneously 
support both stability and change in the pursuit of organisational safety, and that 
also might offer a more integrated approach to understanding core mechanisms of 
organisational resilience and high reliability. One set of processes represents the 
accommodative, transient and temporary adjustments that are continually made 
moment-by-moment to catch, contain or compensate for operational disruptions 
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and fluctuations. This is the ongoing repair, recovery and reaction that is 
continually needed to adjust to the fluctuations and variations in any 
organisational setting. The other set of processes represents the reflective, 
planned and effortful adaptations that are coordinated over time to improve 
systems and practices in light of disruptions. These are the punctuated moments 
of reform, reorganisation and redesign that are required to adapt to the 
disruptions and surprises that emerge in organisational activity. Both of these two 
complementary modes of organising are supported by systemic in situ simulation, 
and both of them appear to explain some of the most fundamental mechanisms 
underlying organisational resilience and high reliability. The former can be 
termed dynamic adjustment, following Weick (1987) and Woods (2006), and the 
latter can be termed adaptive reorganisation, following Hutchins (1996).  
 
5.3.1. Dynamic adjustment 
Dynamic adjustment represents the moment-by-moment adjustments, 
accommodations and responses that are required in practical work to handle the 
fluctuations and variations of normal organisational life. These adjustments may 
required considerable shifts in the way tasks are being performed or teams are 
being organised—for example, at the onset of a maternity emergency an 
immediate cascade of dynamic adjustments must be made to all ongoing activities 
 43 
and work practices, in order to organise tasks and attention around the emerging 
crisis. Alternatively, these dynamic adjustments may involve smaller scale 
adjustments to ongoing work, such as the adjustments that must occur if, for 
instance, the rate of blood loss during an emergency increases, or if a suspected 
diagnosis shifts from a typical bleeding situation to a more challenging situation of 
disseminated intravascular coagulation (DIC) that requires different tasks, 
routines and actions to be performed. Dynamic adjustment therefore spans the 
range of responsive and flexible activities that are characterised by theories of 
high reliability and resilience engineering: it encompasses the moments when 
significant groups of experts may self-organise around difficult operational 
problems (Rochlin, 1999; Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999), and it encompasses 
the practical shifts and compensating actions that continually occur in the face of 
unpredictable variations (Wears and Vincent, 2013).  
Systemic in situ simulation can create the organisational resources that 
support these sorts of ongoing dynamic adjustments, and it can embed the 
interactive patterns, social norms and cultural premises (Weick, 1987) that bound 
the limits of warranted and appropriate behaviour in different settings—what 
Hollnagel calls the “dynamic stability” (Hollnagel, 2006, p. 16) of practice. These 
organisational resources are cognitive and social as much as they are technical 
and material. They include the knowledge and skills required to detect signals of 
emerging problems. They include the shared expectations, assumptions and 
norms that underpin patterns of coordinated working. They include the trust, 
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confidence and willingness to respond to surprising and novel situations. They 
include the algorithms, plans and protocols that support collective cognition. And 
they include the material infrastructure of emergency boxes and organisational 
systems that deliver equipment and support when it is needed.  
These organisational resources are all required to support the ongoing 
dynamic adjustments required to deal with disruptive events, disturbances and 
surprises. Organisations remember by doing (Nelson and Winter, 1982): routines, 
skills and capabilities for acting are maintained by performing them. In situ 
simulation allows rehearsal and practice at deploying these resources to different 
types of challenging scenario, building a collective propensity to attend to certain 
cues, communicate in certain patterns and act in certain ways when confronted 
with unexpected events. Simulation provides the space in which organisational 
memory can be maintained and continually refreshed, even with regard to events 
that happen rarely and can occur in unique and surprising ways.  
However, these plans and propensities for acting in certain ways should not be 
confused with the actual actions that are required when organisations confront 
risk. Reacting to challenging situations is always an inventive process that 
depends on in-the-moment judgement, skill and ingenuity, and is context 
dependent and contingent on the resources and materials at hand. Action should 
not be confused with the plans and preparations that go before it (Suchman, 1987; 
Macrae 2014). Organisational safety is always produced in the moment, by 
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bringing together resources from past moments of socialisation (plans, recipes, 
protocols, routines, collective norms and shared assumptions) and combining 
those with the materials at hand at a specific moment in time (situated awareness, 
medical technologies, professional judgement and deployable knowledge). 
Dynamic adjustment is the practical work of drawing on and applying prior plans, 
propensities and preparation in order to act effectively in the moment.  
 
5.3.2. Adaptive reorganisation 
Adaptive reorganisation represents the effortful processes of reflection, invention 
and adaption that are required to reorganise and redesign practical work and 
organisational systems in light of disruptive and unexpected events. Adaptive 
reorganisation can involve the large-scale reorganisation of work practices, tools 
and support systems, such as developing a new set of more streamlined processes 
to request and deliver blood products to a maternity unit during an emergency. It 
can also involve much smaller, incremental improvements that are targeted at a 
focused area of practice, such as modifying or updating a protocol, or instituting a 
routine of hanging a sign on the door during team debriefings that indicates who 
on the ward has the keys to the drug cabinet. Adaptive reorganisation involves 
reflective, experimental and purposive change of the resources and systems that 
support organisational activities. It represents the longer-term process of learning 
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and adaptation that occur within organisations in response to past experience and 
new evidence of emerging risks. These processes of long-term change and learning 
are often emphasised in the fields of resilience engineering and high reliability 
organising, through remain under-theorised (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 1999).  
Systemic in situ simulation can provide a space to identify problems, examine 
systems, reflect on practices and test improvements. Critically reflecting on 
practices and systems is an essential feature of organisational adaptation and 
learning. In situ simulation allows different elements of collective practices and 
organisational systems to be turned into objects of inquiry themselves (Miettinen 
and Virkunnen, 2005). This allows standardised routines, tools and habits to be 
regularly tested, and reorganised where necessary, ensuring that even highly 
routinised practices and habits can remain intelligent (Miettinen, 2000) and 
flexible. In situ simulation can also ensure that the representations of work-as-
imagined—such as policies, guidelines, protocols and standards—can be routinely 
tested against the practical reality of work-as-done (Woods, 2006; Hollnagel, 
Wears and Braithwaite, 2015). As such, systemic in situ simulation creates an 
affordance for the generative work of producing knowledge about practice itself 
(Cook and Brown, 1999), as well as creating a space for adaptively reorganizing 
those practices. Symbolically disruptive events can act as the trigger for processes 
that reshape both organizational practices, and organizational representations of 
those practices, acting as a source of long term improvement and learning 
(Wenger, 1998; Macrae 2014).  
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6. Towards reliable resilience and resilient 
reliability 
The founding principles of the fields of resilience engineering and high reliability 
organising share much in common. Both aim to understand how organisations 
can maintain high levels of safety through adaptive and flexible work processes. 
Both are committed to understanding the positive characteristics and practical 
strengths that underpin organisational safety. And both are focused on 
understanding the practical and situated work of organisational life. Examining 
key practical strategies of safety improvement, such as in situ simulation, through 
these two complementary lenses provides one route to exploring some of the more 
fundamental issues in organisational safety. In safety management, as in research, 
getting closer to practice can reveal more about our theories: where they are 
useful, where they breakdown, where they connect and where they can be 
improved. This analysis of in situ simulation indicates a variety of ways that our 
understanding of organisational safety might be developed and refined. In 
particular, it suggests that more closely integrating ideas of resilience and 
reliability might be move us beyond overly simplistic dichotomies of success and 
failure, strength and weakness, stability and change (Wears, 2015). 
Understanding organisational safety as a complex duality, defined by trade-offs, 
tensions and unexpected interactions, may offer new ways of integrating key 
 48 
elements of resilience engineering and high reliability organising, whilst also 
revealing the richness, subtlety and power in the practical work that creates 
organisational safety.  
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